The employment relationship is often one of life's most important relationships. In both the United States and other countries this relationship is subject to a wide range of legal requirements. Some of these legal rules regulate the formation and conduct of labor unions, while other rules govern employer-employee relationships regardless of employees' union status.
sections 3 and 4 below. By contrast, bounded will power has received very little attention in behavioral economics analysis of employment law, so I will begin there.
As section 2 below describes, a surprisingly diverse set of employment law rules may be illuminated by considering bounded will power. Bounded will power suggests that individuals often greatly -"quasi hyperbolically" -discount the future, and an important and much-studied implication of such behavior is that at any given point in time individuals will fail to put adequate funds aside for their retirement even though their preferred plan would entail such saving. How does employment law respond to this disjunction between plans and actions?
One response it takes is to make some retirement saving out of employees' earnings a mandatory feature of employment, as occurs through the Social Security system (discussed more fully below). But other employment law mechanisms are more subtle -and more directed to encouraging, rather than compelling, retirement saving by individuals with bounded will power.
Wage payment law, discussed in section 2.2.1, supports the reliability of compensation in part through bonus payments, and substantial empirical evidence suggests that these are far more likely than ordinary wages to generate substantial retirement saving by individuals with bounded will power. In addition, regulation of employer-provided pension plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) targets bounded will power both directly -in restricting early withdrawals from pension plans -and indirectly -through incentives provided to corporate executives, as described in section 2.2.2. Finally, section 2 concludes with an account of how age discrimination law may encourage retirement saving among individuals with bounded will power by facilitating the use of back-loaded wage profiles, which place limits on the level of liquidity-constrained employees' present consumption. Section 3 turns to bounded self-interest and describes evidence that employers and employees are frequently engaged in a "fairness dynamic," in which employers choose to pay employees more than the minimum amount those employees would accept in exchange for their labor, and in which employees respond to such "fair behavior" by working harder than they otherwise would. The "fairness dynamic" turns out to have a number of implications for employment law's minimum wage regulation (Jolls 2002 ). An interesting feature of the discussion in this section is that behavioral economics -although it is often viewed as comparatively more supportive than neoclassical economics of heightened legal regulationmay at times carry a deregulatory impulse.
Section 4 examines bounded rationality and describes how both judgment errors and departures from expected utility theory have been brought to bear on the analysis of important features of employment law. "Erroneous" judgments (a concept that will be developed below) are relevant to understanding both the effects of existing employment discrimination law (Jolls 2007b ) and the desirability of proposed reforms of that law (Krieger and Fiske 2006) . Meanwhile, with respect to departures from expected utility theory, Section 4 describes how behavioral economics analysis of the "endowment effect" (Thaler 1980) highlights the importance of the presence versus absence of particular legally mandated employee benefitssuch as health insurance and workplace leave -to equilibrium outcomes; in the presence of the endowment effect, the fact that a particular employee benefit is not contracted for, even in a market with perfect information, does not lead to the neoclassical economic prediction that mandating the benefit operates effectively as a tax that will depress employment levels (Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler 1998).
As described in this paper, a wide range of employment law rules -from wage payment law to pension regulation to minimum wages to prohibitions on employment discrimination to mandated health insurance and workplace leave -are illuminated by behavioral economics. In some cases, behavioral economics analysis seems to produce a better fit with existing legal rules than does familiar neoclassical economic analysis; employment law rules that tend to be viewed critically by neoclassical economic analysts appear more sensible when viewed through a behavioral lens. At other times, as in the work of Krieger and Fiske (2006) , the behavioral economics perspective suggests existing legal shortcomings that only come into focus through the adoption of this perspective. Both in understanding and in improving employment law, then, behavioral economics has an important role to play.
Bounded Will Power, Wage Payment Law, Pension and Social Security Regulation, and Age Discrimination Law
A large-scale study by Merrill Lynch asked baby boomers, "What percentage of your annual household income are you now saving for retirement?" and "What percentage of your annual household income do you think you should save for retirement?" The average gap between the two answers was 11 percent of household income (Bernheim 1995) . 1 Why do people often choose to spend their earnings despite their best intentions to save for retirement?
Behavioral economics analyzes the disjunction between intentions and actual behavior by emphasizing the concept of bounded will power -people's inability to stick to plans they set for themselves. Much empirical evidence supports the idea of such bounded will power, as section 2.1 below describes. It is thus no surprise that the law makes a wide range of attempts to 1 As Bernheim notes, it is not clear that respondents understand "annual household income" the way economists do, but the substantial gap between the answers to the two very similarly worded questions seems hard to explain as an artifact of such potential limits on respondents' understanding. increase people's retirement saving in the face of their apparent bounded will power. Some of the law's attempts -such as the facilitation of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) -occur wholly outside of the employer-employee relationship, but others occur through regulation of this relationship and, thus, are discussed below. Behavioral economics illuminates how a diverse set of employment law rules -some having no direct relationship to retirement saving -are likely to increase such saving among individuals with bounded will power.
Before proceeding, it is important to distinguish the discussion here from the existing literature on actual and potential legal responses to boundedly rational behavior -especially in the form of status quo bias and the resulting influence of default options -in the retirement saving context. Benartzi and Thaler (2007) provide a comprehensive recent survey of how bounded rationality shapes retirement saving behavior. The focus here, by contrast, is on bounded will power.
Bounded Will Power
The problem of bounded will power arises in a wide range of domains; people often choose to consume desserts over salads, start new projects rather than finishing old ones, and fail to go to the gym regularly despite their earnestly-laid plans to do so. The discussion of bounded will power here, however, focuses on the specific domain of retirement saving.
A study by Richard Thaler (1981) provides an early suggestion of the strong impatience many people display for immediate over delayed financial rewards. Thaler asked subjects to imagine that they had won $15 in a lottery and could either take the money now or put it away for later. The subjects were asked how much they would require for waiting to be as attractive as immediate payment, with time horizons of one month, one year, and ten years. Subjects were specifically instructed to assume that the money would be preserved in a risk-free setting with no chance of future nonpayment. The median amounts stated for the one-month, one-year, and tenyear periods were $20, $50 and $100 respectively. These answers imply average annual discount rates of 345 percent, 120 percent, and 19 percent for the one-month, one-year, and ten-year periods.
Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2002) provide a graphical illustration of the evidence from a range of empirical studies of discount rates that, as in Thaler's study, decline with the time horizon. The vertical axis on their graph shows the discount factor, and the horizontal axis shows the time horizon. The graph shows that the longer the time horizon, the higher the discount factor -and thus the lower the discount rate. Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue further show that the pattern of declining discount rates with the length of the time horizon is almost solely a product of people's strong impatience for near-term rewards; when they omit studies with time horizons of less than one year from their analysis, discount rates and then length of the time horizon across the remaining studies are essentially uncorrelated.
The evidence discussed by Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue points strongly toward hyperbolic discounting, a pattern under which periods after the present are discounted substantially in relation to the present but are discounted only modestly in relation to other periods. Mathematically, an individual's discount factor -the weight attached to utility in period k -may be approximated by D(k) = βδ k (for k > 0 and β, δ ∈ (0,1) ), where β reflects the discounting of all periods other than the present and δ reflects the successively higher discounting of periods further into the future. This form of discounting is called "quasi hyperbolic."
Further empirical support for the sort of discounting discussed here comes from the observation of preference reversals in intertemporal decision making. A preference reversal occurs when an individual prefers to receive (say) $110 a week after a specified future date to $100 on this date but then, when the date actually arrives, prefers to receive $100 immediately to $110 in a week. Such inconsistency over time is an obvious consequence of the asymmetric discounting of future periods depending on whether they are being compared to other future periods or to the present. Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2002) refer to a number of empirical studies finding such preference reversals.
With hyperbolic discounting, an individual will tend to defer saving in favor of present consumption in each period, even though such deferral is inconsistent with what the individual would have wanted to do in that period if the individual had been able to make an earlier choice about behavior in that period. Indeed, in some cases it is possible to show (Phelps and Pollak 1968:196 n1 ) that a pattern in which the individual is unconstrained in the consumption-saving decision in each period is Pareto inferior to -that is, worse for the individual in every period than -a pattern in which the individual is constrained to save in every period. Intuitively, all of the individual's temporal selves can be made better off through a commitment of each self not to
give in to present desires to consume.
2 2 The conclusion about Pareto inferiority assumes that when the individual is unconstrained the individual will choose a constant consumption level across periods. To understand this assumption, note that the individual's multiple temporal selves may be viewed as players in a noncooperative game (Laibson 1996) . The game between the temporal selves will often have multiple equilibria; however, plans calling for consumption at a constant rate each period can reasonably be thought of as focal points.
Note that throughout the analysis in this section -following most of the economics literature on bounded will power -individuals are assumed to be aware of their bounded will power and its consequences for behavior in each period; in the terminology of O' Donoghue and Rabin (1999) , individuals are assumed to be "sophisticates" rather than "naifs." While Akerlof (1991) claims that he was a "naif" in his decision making about mailing a package of Joe Stiglitz's clothes from India back to Stiglitz, hopefully he will forgive readers who feel somewhat skeptical about this claim. Many responses to bounded will power in the retirement saving context are possible, but one intriguing potential response that operates without any form of direct legal constraint -a theme to which I will return below -is the recharacterization of employees' earnings through various forms of mental accounting. Some earnings do not appear to be coded as "available for present consumption" in the same way that ordinary wages are. People appear far more likely, for example, to save substantial fractions of bonus payments, even when they fail to engage in substantial saving out of funds received as ordinary wages (Thaler 1990 ). Contrary to the assumption of neoclassical economics, not all dollars are treated the same (Zelizer 1994) . Links between this phenomenon and employment law are explored in the next subsection.
Implications of Bounded Will Power for Wage Payment Law, Pension and Social Security Regulation, and Age Discrimination Law
This subsection discusses a diverse range of employment law rules in light of bounded will power in the retirement saving context.
Wage Payment Law
As just noted, many people save substantially more out of bonuses than out of regular wage payments (Thaler 1990 Note that the discussion here is descriptive rather than normative; it concerns the effects of wage payment law on retirement saving, not the normative desirability of such law. From a normative perspective, a general concern with legal support for compensation through bonuses as a mechanism for encouraging retirement saving is that, absent the possibility of a Pareto improvement for all of an individual's multiple selves (a prospect briefly noted above), it is unclear whether increasing retirement saving is, on balance, normatively desirable assuming, plausibly, that it often benefits future selves at the expense of earlier selves, an argument in favor of that ordering is needed.
Beyond this general issue, a potential concern with legally supporting bonus-based compensation as a way of encouraging retirement saving is that, precisely because individuals account for bonuses in a way different from the way they account for ordinary wages, it is possible that employers are more able to cut, or fail to increase, compensation than they would be able to do if the compensation were paid solely in the form of ordinary wages. In other words, because a substantial fraction of bonus payments goes to retirement saving -which by hypothesis is undervalued by individuals' present selves -employers relying on bonuses may over time face lower total compensation demands from their employees than employers relying solely on ordinary wages. Of course, the point is purely speculative at this juncture.
The most direct prediction of bounded will power is that individuals will often be tempted to withdraw 401(k) funds for current consumption. To be sure, such withdrawals might be desirable in some cases even for an individual with unbounded will power; an emergency might have arisen. But an individual with bounded will power will be tempted to make withdrawals even apart from such exigencies.
ERISA's restrictions on employees' ability to make early withdrawals from 401(k) plans can be understood as a natural response to bounded will power. (Weiss 1991 offers related discussion.) Under ERISA, employees who wish to make early withdrawals typically must establish that they fall into a set of categories structured around either exigent circumstances or alternative forms of earning or saving (see Treas. Reg. §1.401(k)-1(d)). The first category includes preventing eviction or home foreclosure and covering major medical expenses; the second category includes pursuing higher education (which generally increases earnings) and purchasing a primary home (an alternative form of saving). Interestingly, individuals asked whether they would prefer to face fewer restrictions on withdrawals generally report that they would not prefer fewer restrictions (Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman 1998) . ERISA does allow 401(k) plans to permit borrowing by individuals against the plan proceeds, 4 though such borrowing is probably made less likely by the fact that in mental accounting terms the funds have been "marked" for long-term purposes (Thaler 1994) . Finally, ERISA is a mandatory regime and thus, cannot be avoided by a contrary agreement between employer and employee; otherwise much of the benefit of ERISA in responding to the problem of bounded will power could disappear as profitable renegotiation of limitations on withdrawals would exist at times at which individuals are tempted to spend (though the mental accounting point might be enough to prevent such an outcome). At bottom, then, ERISA sets up a flexible regime -more flexible, for instance, than the sort of uniform tax discussed in Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2005) or than illiquid assets that are costly to unload in exigent circumstances -that nonetheless helps to support retirement saving by individuals suffering from bounded will power.
5
An additional aspect of ERISA that responds to the problem of insufficient retirement saving under bounded will power is the way in which the statute harnesses the personal incentives of corporate executives in the service of increased retirement saving. Because of the high income and wealth of many corporate executives, putting aside funds for retirement will typically be less difficult for these individuals than for individuals at the low end of the wage scale. (Note that the point is not that corporate executives have fewer bounds on their will power as a general matter. Plenty of corporate executives have as much trouble sticking to their exercise plans as the rest of society does. The point here is simply that it will typically take less will power to put aside money for retirement when one is earning at a high level than when funds are scarce.) Thus, a reasonable worry with respect to retirement saving is that those at the helm of firms will not have sufficient incentives to structure 401(k) plans in ways that provide the broadest possible support for saving by individuals with bounded will power. In response to this worry, ERISA limits retirement contributions by high-level employees unless low-level employees are participating to an adequate degree (see, e.g., Bankman 1988). These limitations encourage corporate executives to think creatively about structuring 401(k) plans to encourage saving in a robust way (Thaler 1994) .
In a clear example of the effects of this aspect of ERISA, Thaler and Benartzi (2004) describe how executives at one company sought to increase low-level employees' saving (in order to increase the executives' own retirement saving options) through a 401(k) plan structure called "Save More Tomorrow". Under this plan, which was developed by Thaler and Benartzi, individuals are invited to save a fraction of future pay (often but not always taken from future pay raises). Because individuals are not being asked to reduce their current consumption in any way, bounded will power is less likely to interfere with a decision to save. In fact, the "Save
More Tomorrow" plan has produced striking increases in retirement saving at some earlyadopting companies (Thaler and Benartzi 2004) . At one company, for example, those who participated in the plan -the vast majority of employees -more than tripled their saving rates in 28 months.
As with respect to the effects on retirement saving of covering bonuses under wage payment law, the normative analysis here is complex. Once again it is possible that the law benefits future selves at the expense of earlier selves, with the attendant normative question of the desirability of that outcome. Alternatively, it is possible that -precisely because individuals' present selves show limited concern with retirement saving -individuals will care less about their compensation levels with a Save More Tomorrow or similar plan in place. In other words, an individual may have a less negative reaction to getting a three-percent raise instead of a fivepercent raise if much of the pay increase was going to retirement saving instead of present consumption. Again, though, the point is speculative, and what is clear is the descriptive point that ERISA's nondiscrimination rules, in encouraging steps such as the adoption of Save More Tomorrow plan, are likely to have the effect of increasing retirement saving.
Social Security
Both wage payment law and ERISA impose various mandatory terms in employeremployee relationships -terms that I have suggested tend to have the effect of increasing retirement saving by individuals with bounded will power. But these mandatory terms operate in conjunction with voluntary choices made in the employer-employee relationship; employers need not use employee bonuses or offer pension plans at all, but if they do then mandatory rules under wage payment law and ERISA attach.
A different type of employment law mandate that also may be understood as a response to bounded will power is the Social Security system. Social Security is, in magnitude terms, a very significant aspect of the "employment contract" between employers and employees; those who work -and only those who work -make contributions to the program, retirement benefits are limited to the employees who contributed and the dependents of these employees, and the dollar amounts involved are very large (Feldstein and Liebman 2002) .
Employer-employee agreement is always insufficient to avoid the requirements of the Social Security system; in any relationship in which any form of compensation is being paid, saving in a world of bounded will power -while not completely uncontroverted -is on relatively firmer ground.
Age Discrimination Law
An additional potential means of facilitating retirement saving in a world of bounded will power is the back-loading of wages. If funds do not arrive until later in the lifecycle, individuals are effectively forced not to spend them earlier (except in the event that they are able to borrow against the back-loaded amounts -something we observe only to a limited degree in practice).
In fact, substantial empirical evidence suggests a pattern of back-loaded wages -wages that slope upward with age even after controlling for changes in productivity -for many employees (e.g., Medoff and Abraham 1980; Medoff and Abraham 1981) . Explanations for the apparent appeal of back-loaded wages include not only the bounded will power phenomenon emphasized here but also incentive-based explanations (Lazear 1979 ) and psychological explanations rooted in individuals' desire to experience gains over time (Loewenstein and Sicherman 1991; Frank and Hutchens 1993) . Note that the bounded will power explanation for back-loaded wages requires that individuals cannot renegotiate their wage levels during periods of temptation to spend -an assumption that may be reasonable in many cases because a wage change would not be reflected until the individual's next paycheck at the earliest. (See Laibson,
Repetto and Tobacman (1998) for related discussion.)
An important problem with back-loaded wages, however, is that they are highly vulnerable to exploitation by employers in the absence of effective legal constraints; at the end of the lifecycle, when the back-loaded portion of employees' compensation comes due, employees will be net drains on employers, and therefore employers will be eager to discharge them if It bears noting, however, that if back-loaded wage are desired solely because of bounded will power and not in part because of the incentive or psychological considerations noted above, then alternate forms of legal intervention might be the optimal response. In particular, backloaded wage entitlements could be packaged as vested portable pensions, so that older employees would not present higher current wage costs for employers (Jolls 1996) . With the removal of such higher wage costs, the employer opportunism problem noted above would disappear. In the absence of vested portable pensions, however, support for back-loaded wage structures through the ADEA will tend to encourage retirement saving among individuals with bounded will power.
Once again, the analysis here is descriptive in nature. A normative account of the ADEA as a response to bounded will power in the retirement saving context would be subject to the now-familiar caveats about the conflict between maximizing the satisfaction of earlier versus later selves' preferences and about potential effects on employees' overall level of compensation.
Bounded Self-Interest and Minimum Wage Regulation
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Turning from bounded will power to bounded self-interest, behavioral economics has emphasized the way in which individuals often choose actions that do not maximize their material self-interest. Substantial empirical evidence suggests that in the employment context, employees often respond to "fair" wages by working harder than they otherwise would (even absent any mechanism for adjusting wages in response to the effort level). Section 3.1 describes this "fairness dynamic," while Section 3.2 discusses its implications for minimum wage regulation.
The Fairness Dynamic in Employer-Employee Relationships
As Robert Solow has written (1990, pp. 9-10), "[T]he fundamental reason for believing that fairness is a factor in labor markets is what we know about our own society and culture. . . .
[W]age rates and employment are profoundly entwined with social status and self-esteem . . . ."
Indeed, fairness may play many important roles in wage setting and other aspects of the employment relationship. Studies by Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch and Richard Thaler (1986) , Alan Blinder and Don Choi (1990), and Carl Campbell and Kunal Kamlani (1997) , for example, examine perceptions of the fairness or unfairness of wage adjustments in response to various demand-or supply-side shifts in the economy and find that such perceptions have significant effects. Fairness also appears to play a major role in the determination of the relative wages of various groups of employees within a firm, as David Levine (1993) and Truman Bewley (1999, pp. 75-82) , among others, have emphasized.
The discussion below, however, focuses not on this whole range of fairness behavior in the employment relationship but rather on one specific form of such behavior. The behavior on which I focus has its theoretical basis in the efficiency wage model of George Akerlof and Janet Yellen (1990) . In this model, employers pay wages above employees' "reservation wage" -the minimum level they would demand for their services -in order to induce reciprocation in the form of high levels of effort. On a macroeconomic level, this fairness dynamic can explain the otherwise puzzling existence of involuntary unemployment in the economy. In the first stage of Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl's experiment, "employers" are given a specified period of time in which to bid for the services of a single, unknown "employee." 8 Bids consist of the wage that the employer will pay the employee. In the second stage, those employees who have accepted offers of employment at the specified wages are able to set an effort level at which they will perform. Higher effort levels are associated with increases in employers' payoffs, as employers earn higher profits, but with decreases in employees' payoffs, as effort is costly. Wages may not be made contingent upon effort levels, and employers have no ability to retaliate for low effort levels in future periods because they do not know the identity of their particular employee. Thus, it is impossible for employers to induce high effort levels by a strategy of monitoring employees and punishing them for poor performance.
According to the traditional model, the results of this experiment are quite predictable.
Employees will always choose the minimum effort level in the second period so as to maximize their payoffs; their wage has been fixed in the first period, punishment for low effort is not feasible, and effort is costly. Employers, aware of this incentive, should assume low employee effort and offer a wage that puts employees just above their "reservation level" (the minimum level they would demand for their services). Employees should accept the offered wage since it is above the reservation level. The result is a low-wage, low-effort equilibrium. Does this simple prediction square with the experimental results? No. Employers in the above setting typically choose wage levels above the level predicted by the analysis just described, and employees respond by choosing effort levels significantly in excess of the minimum feasible level.
These results suggest concerns with fairness. Workers who receive wages above the low level predicted by the traditional analysis may offer high levels of effort in response based on their perceptions of the fairness of the employers' behavior, and employers, aware of this result, can maximize their profits by offering such generous wages. This is the basic mechanism contemplated by the Akerlof and Yellen theory. Subsequent work by Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gächter (1998) confirms the fit between the Akerlof and Yellen model and the behavior we observe in the experiments by showing that employers' offers of high wages do not reflect an unwillingness by employees to work for less but instead, as envisioned by the efficiency wage model, reflect a desire by employers to encourage high levels of effort by paying employees more than the reservation level they would demand for their services.
Considerations of fairness arise in the context under discussion because when employers cannot directly monitor their employees' effort (as in the experiments here), employers seek to encourage employees to perform well in response to being offered "fair" wages. Where high effort cannot be ensured through monitoring and punishment, a fair wage provides an alternative means by which an employer may be able to encourage an employee to exert effort.
In broad terms, the fairness dynamic described here is consistent with economics and political science literatures suggesting the efficiency aspects of "trust" relationships.
Empirically, there is some evidence that higher levels of trust are correlated across regions and across countries with better economic performance (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). These results suggest that the opportunity to build upon trust relationships enhances efficiency.
Implications of the Fairness Dynamic for Minimum Wage Regulation
This subsection describes some implications of the fairness dynamic for minimum wage regulation under employment law. At the most basic level, the fairness dynamic suggests that a minimum wage requirement may be less necessary to raise wages than might otherwise be thought, for the essential idea behind the dynamic is that employers and employees may find their way to an equilibrium with higher wages entirely on their own. But at some level this observation is too simple, for a premise of the fairness dynamic is that high effort cannot be ensured by the direct mechanism of monitoring effort and then punishing employees who fail to perform up to par. Such monitoring and punishment are obviously possible in some settings, and thus a more refined set of conclusions from the fairness dynamic focuses on settings in which a minimum wage requirement is likely to be more or less necessary to raise wages.
The discussion to follow emphasizes the ease of monitoring rather than the ease of punishment for low effort by an employee because the former seems easier to theorize about a priori. 9 The discussion uses differences in the likely ease of monitoring to try to make sense of the scope of coverage of the minimum wage requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and to predict variations in the degree of compliance with this requirement within covered sectors. The basic insight is that once fairness is taken into account, a minimum wage requirement is less necessary to raise wages, all else equal, in situations in which employees are difficult to monitor than in situations in which they are relatively easy to monitor. (A minimum wage may still be important in setting expectations of what counts as a "fair" wage, however.) If employees are difficult to monitor, then fairness considerations may push toward a higher wage wholly apart from legal regulation, as employers strive to pay employees "fairly" in order to encourage diligence and hard work on the employees' part. If, by contrast, monitoring is relatively easy, then fairness considerations do not create any upward pressure on wages, as employees can simply be fired if monitoring discloses that they have not performed well.
Minimum wage laws are more necessary to raise wages, all else equal, in the latter context.
In terms of the FLSA's coverage, the claim here will not be that the fairness dynamic provides a comprehensive framework to make sense of the overall statutory structure of the FLSA's minimum wage requirement. That requirement is subject to a number of rather randomsounding exemptions, including for various employees working in the fishing and agricultural industries, employees working in summer camps and similar recreational establishments, and employees employed by small newspapers or telephone companies. 10 The analysis offered here does not purport to explain all of these exemptions, just to make some sense of the specific ones discussed below.
The Historical Exemption of Domestic Service Employees
Until 1974, all domestic service employees were exempt from the FLSA (Smith 2000) .
At one level, this exemption seems quite surprising, as at least some domestic employees are quite vulnerable as economic actors. Why should these employees have been excluded from the coverage of the minimum wage requirement?
Concerns of family privacy have been adduced in support of the exemption of domestic service employees (Smith 1999) . (Other accounts emphasize racial aspects, as noted below.) As one historical source put it, "[The domestic's] position is peculiar. She is in the family, but not of it . . . ."
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The fairness dynamic, however, provides an interesting variation on this theme of household "privacy." Some forms of household work -for instance, care for children -are difficult to monitor. While one knows whether the employee is present for work, the quality of the work is, or can be, extremely subtle in its variations, in ways that cannot be monitored well unless the employer hovers over the employee, which of course would tend to defeat the purpose of hiring the employee in the first place. The fairness dynamic suggests that employers and employees may end up at an equilibrium with a higher-than-expected wage, and a correspondingly higher level of effort, without the intervention of a minimum wage requirement.
If this analysis carries some truth, then a minimum wage requirement may be less necessary to raise the wages of certain domestic service employees than to raise the wages of otherwise similar employees working in different settings.
Of course, many domestic service employees perform tasks -such as various housework duties -that may not involve the sort of discretion associated with child care, and much of the literature on domestic service employees and their abuse at their employers' hands focuses directly on such employees, who are not the subject of the fairness argument here and who may very well desperately need the protection of a minimum wage requirement (for example , Smith 2000) . Moreover, at the other end of the spectrum, certain domestic service employees -such as high-level professional nannies -are in a different category from those domestic service employees who could conceivably stand to gain from the application of a minimum wage requirement, as these professional nannies earn dramatically in excess of the minimum wage 11 Massachusetts Labor Bulletin, vol. 13, p. 1 (1900) .
(see, for example, Eaton 1998). However, as described in Jolls (2002) , some in-home child care workers do earn relatively low wages (and presumably also did in the past, although it is hard to get access to good data for the pre-1974 period for child care workers as distinguished from other domestic service employees); and thus it remains an interesting question whether it makes sense for the minimum wage requirement to apply to these child care workers.
It is important to emphasize that the notion of a "higher wage" equilibrium as a result of the fairness dynamic does not necessarily ensure that the employees in question were earningprior to the elimination in 1974 of the FLSA exemption -a "living wage," one capable of sustaining them at reasonable standards. Even a wage above the minimum required by the FLSA might well not be a living wage. Whether it is depends, of course, on the gap between the legally required minimum and the level required for a living wage. As an interesting point of comparison, in the Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl study described above, the result of fairness behavior is an average wage that is more than twice the wage predicted by the traditional economic theory.
Note that the point here is not that Congress drafted the exemption for domestic service employees based on the fairness dynamic described above. My point here is not to describe the intent or goals of Congress. Instead, the fairness dynamic provides a possible rationalization, or way to make sense, of the statutory exemption of domestic service employees, whose exclusion Linder (1987; 1992 pp. 154-55) suggests in fact resulted from racism on the part of New Deal lawmakers.
The Failure to Cover Independent Contractors
The FLSA's minimum wage requirement applies to "employees" but not to "independent contractors." Unlike the limit pertaining to domestic service employees, this limit on the coverage of the FLSA continues in effect today. As with the aspects of the FLSA discussed above, it may be possible to make some sense of this feature of the law by reference to the fairness dynamic and the relative difficulty of monitoring independent contractors versus employees.
Under the FLSA, whether an individual is an independent contractor or an employee turns on the following factors:
1. the nature and degree of the employer's control as to the manner in which the work is to be performed;
2. the individual's opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill;
3. the individual's investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of workers;
4. whether the service rendered requires a special skill;
5. the degree of permanency and duration of the working relationship; 6. the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of the employer's business.
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The first, fourth, and fifth of these factors are likely to correlate with the difficulty of monitoring an individual's work. The less control an employer has as to the manner in which the work is to be performed (the first factor), the more difficult it is likely to be for the employer to monitor that work. Similarly, the more skilled the individual's work (the fourth factor), the more difficult it is likely to be for the employer to monitor the work. And finally, the lesser the degree 12 Again, see Jolls (2002) for detail on the legal provisions.
of permanency and duration of the working relationship (the fifth factor), the greater the difficulty of (successful) monitoring of the individual's work, as there will not be a long horizon over which the employer can look for poor performance. Based upon these factors, the work of independent contractors is likely to be more difficult, all else equal, to monitor than that of employees, and thus, according to the fairness dynamic, the application of a minimum wage requirement will be less necessary, all else equal, to raise the wages of independent contractors than to raise the wages of employees.
The fairness dynamic thus provides some assistance in making sense of the oft-criticized failure of the FLSA to cover independent contractors. This is not to say, though, that every exclusion accomplished by that coverage failure makes sense; some exclusions -such as that by some courts of migrant farm workers -seem hard to consider sensible or warranted.
Costs of Minimum Wage Law
The central implication of the fairness dynamic is that the minimum wage requirement of the FLSA is less necessary, all else equal, to raise wages in settings in which monitoring is difficult than in settings in which monitoring is less difficult. But perhaps this argument implies nothing more than that a minimum wage requirement would simply be irrelevant in settings in which, because of monitoring difficulties, fairness pushes up wages without the need for legal intervention. What are the costs, if any, of imposing a minimum wage requirement? Why bother exempting certain employees if the law would simply be irrelevant to them given the operation of the fairness dynamic?
From a law and economics perspective, it may seem obvious that any form of legal regulation is likely to carry with it costs, so that a regulation that is believed to produce no or few positive effects obviously should not be imposed. But it is worth pausing briefly to consider what exactly these costs might be insofar as minimum wage regulation is concerned.
First, like any legal regulation, a minimum wage requirement imposes administrative costs, for even an employer who has conformed substantively to the requirement may always be haled into court and asked to prove to the court's satisfaction that it has done so. The associated legal and other costs may be substantial. Furthermore, an employer who must be able to prove in court that it has met the minimum wage requirement will need to track and maintain records of the specific number of hours worked by each employee in exchange for the pay received by the employee, and this practice obviously entails costs. Most related to the ideas explored above, it may be the case that minimum wage regulation in a particular setting would serve as a signal to market participants that employers were not sufficiently trustworthy to be left on their own in setting wages. Minimum wage regulation thus might disrupt the operation of the fairness dynamic.
Political Orientation
As suggested in the introduction, it is interesting to observe that the policy implications of the fairness dynamic tend to be distinctly of the laissez-faire variety. If people will behave appropriately without legal regulation -as the fairness dynamic suggests they may -then perhaps the market should be left to function without legal regulation. This creates an intriguing political juxtaposition, as political liberals are probably more open in general to the importance of a phenomenon like fairness, but then when one looks to implications for the law it turns out that, at least in this context, the conclusions are generally more apt to please political conservatives.
While some might naturally assume that behavioral economics (as compared to traditional economic theory) is more rather than less likely to provide normative support for legal intervention -and while in some cases, such as in the discussion in Section 4.1 below, this may be true -the case of fairness is an important counterexample. If we take seriously the idea that people care about fair treatment, they may be more likely than we would otherwise assume to resolve their conflicts on their own, and the role of the law will accordingly be reduced.
Two qualifications to this statement are important. First, an implicit assumption underlying the laissez-faire nature of the normative conclusion just outlined is that the benefit of pushing up wages outweighs the cost of the reduced employment that is likely to come along with higher wages for those who remain employed. When a minimum wage is imposed by Congress, one might reasonably assume that the trade-off between higher wages and higher employment has been resolved by the polity in favor of higher wages (assuming that there is in fact such a trade-off). But when the increase in wages occurs, as in the discussion here, through the operation of market forces rather than through legislation, it is, ironically, possible at least in theory that the resulting wage is too high relative to the social optimum, and thus that government intervention is needed to protect opportunities for employment from encroachment by excessive wage levels. So fairness, in this particular context, could conceivably argue for the necessity of market intervention rather than against the necessity of such intervention.
Second, it is possible that the occurrence of the fairness dynamic may turn on cultural or other similarities within the workplace. Trust may not be able to cross cultural barriers, and if so legal intervention may remain necessary to achieve desirable outcomes. The more general point is that it is often more difficult than observers have realized to generalize about the political orientation of behavioral law and economics.
Bounded Rationality, Employment Discrimination Law, and Employment Mandates
This section addresses employment law responses to a third bound on human behavior, bounded rationality. Because of the breadth of the category of bounded rationality, it is useful to subdivide this category into the subcategories of judgment errors (discussed in section 4.1) and departures from expected utility theory (discussed in section 4.2).
Judgment Errors and Employment Discrimination Law
This subsection begins by describing the nature of judgment errors and then discusses the ways in which concerns about judgment errors both are and are not well addressed by existing employment discrimination law.
Judgment Errors
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One important general way in which human rationality is bounded is that people rely on mental shortcuts or rules of thumb -"heuristics" -that function well in many settings but lead to systematic errors in others. Consider, for instance, the well-known study involving people's judgments about a thirty-one-year-old woman, Linda, who was concerned with issues of social justice and discrimination in college. 14 People tend to say that Linda was more likely to be a "feminist bank teller" than to be a "bank teller." This judgment is patently illogical, for a superset cannot be smaller than a set within it. The source of the mistake is the representativeness heuristic, by which events are seen to be more likely if they "look like" certain causes. In the case of Linda, the use of the representativeness heuristic leads to a mistake 13 This subsection is a slightly modified version of material from the introduction and Part I of Jolls and Sunstein (2006) . 14 Kahneman and Frederick (2002) provide a succinct description of the study and its results.
of elementary logic -the conclusion that characteristics X and Y are more likely to be present than characteristic X.
Research in cognitive psychology emphasizes that heuristics of this kind frequently work through a process of "attribute substitution," in which people answer a hard question by substituting an easier one (Kahneman and Frederick 2002) . For instance, people might resolve a question of probability not by investigating statistics, but by asking whether a relevant incident comes easily to mind. Often (although not always) the use of the heuristic occurs without any conscious awareness on the part of the actor; within the domain of "dual process" approaches (see generally Chaiken and Trope 1999) , heuristic-based thinking is typically rooted in "System I," which is rapid, intuitive, and error-prone, rather than in the more deliberative "System II."
An important category of System I thinking, which may be heuristic-based in an important sense, is implicit bias on the basis of race and other group-based traits. Such implicit bias is most familiarly associated with scores on the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which has been taken by large and diverse populations on the Internet and elsewhere (Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz 1998; Nosek, Banaji and Greenwald 2002) . The IAT asks individuals to perform the seemingly straightforward task of categorizing a series of words or pictures into groups. Two of the groups are racial or other categories, such as "black" and "white," and two of the groups are the categories "pleasant" and "unpleasant." In the version of the IAT designed to test for implicit racial bias, respondents are asked to press one key on the computer for either "black" or "unpleasant" words or pictures and a different key for either "white" or "pleasant" words or pictures (a stereotype-consistent pairing); in a separate round of the test, respondents are asked to press one key on the computer for either "black" or "pleasant" words or pictures and a different key for either "white" or "unpleasant" words or pictures (a stereotype-inconsistent pairing).
Implicit bias against African-Americans is defined as faster responses when the "black" and "unpleasant" categories are paired than when the "black" and "pleasant" categories are paired.
The IAT is rooted in the very simple hypothesis that people will find it easier to associate pleasant words with white faces and names than with African-American faces and names -and that the same pattern will be found for other traditionally disadvantaged groups. In fact, implicit bias as measured by the IAT has proven to be extremely widespread; most people tend to prefer white to African-American, young to old, and heterosexual to gay (Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz 1998; Nosek, Banaji and Greenwald 2002) .
Implicit bias is System I in nature because it is largely automatic; the characteristic in question (skin color, age, sexual orientation) operates so quickly, in the relevant tests, that people have no time to deliberate. It is for this reason that people are often surprised to find that they show implicit bias. Indeed, many people say in good faith that they are fully committed to an antidiscrimination principle with respect to the very trait against which they show a bias (Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz 1998) . Not surprisingly, this sort of bias has complex implications for employment law rules regulating discrimination on the basis of race and other group-based traits, as discussed just below.
Implicit Bias and Employment Discrimination Law
In some ways, implicit bias raises the possibility that existing employment discrimination law has bias-reducing effects beyond those usually contemplated (section 4.1.2.1); in other ways, implicit bias suggests important shortcomings of existing employment discrimination law (section 4.1.2.2).
The Bias-Reducing Effects of Existing Employment Discrimination Law
As summarized in Jolls (2007b) , a substantial literature in employment discrimination law argues that existing law is severely misguided as a result of its failure to target implicitly biased behavior for legal prohibition. The central target of existing employment discrimination law is consciously, rather than implicitly, biased behavior. Nonetheless, Jolls (2007b) emphasizes that existing law does have important effects on implicit bias because in prohibiting consciously biased employment actions -as well as in restricting harassing behavior in the workplace -existing law helps to reduce implicit bias in employment relationships.
Consider first existing employment discrimination law's prohibition on consciously biased employment actions, most importantly hiring and firing decisions. This prohibition naturally tends to increase workplace diversity; and substantial evidence suggests that more diverse environments encourage lower implicit bias (Dasgupta and Asgari 2004; Lowery, Hardin and Sinclair 2001; Richeson and Ambady 2003) . Thus existing employment discrimination law will tend to reduce implicit bias (Jolls 2007b ). Lowery, Hardin and Sinclair, for example, find that an in-person IAT administered by an African-American rather than a white experimenter yields significantly lower measured levels of implicit bias. In other words, people's speed in characterizing black-unpleasant and white-pleasant pairs is closer to their speed in characterizing black-pleasant and white-unpleasant pairs when an African-American experimenter is present.
Similarly, Richeson and Ambady (2003) find that white test subjects paired with an AfricanAmerican partner exhibit less implicit bias as measured by the IAT than white test subjects paired with a white partner. These findings suggest that simply by increasing the level of population diversity in the workplace, existing employment discrimination law tends to reduce the level of implicit bias.
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A similar analysis applies to employment discrimination law's prohibition on harassing behavior in the workplace. Both evidence and common sense suggest that the presence of stereotypic images of a particular group -for instance, a "pin-up" calendar featuring nude women in submissive poses -tends to increase implicit bias with respect to that group. 16 If so, then existing harassment law, by restricting negative or demeaning depictures of particular groups, helps to reduce the level of implicit bias (Jolls 2007b ).
The Limits of Existing Employment Discrimination Law
The suggestion just above was that the asserted irrelevance of existing employment discrimination law to the phenomenon of implicit bias was overstated; existing law, although it does not aim at implicitly bias in any direct way, nonetheless is likely to have the effect of reducing such bias in the workplace. Still, it is to be expected that the formulation of existing law without real attention to the problem of implicitly biased behavior would leave such behavior underregulated in important ways, and Krieger and Fiske's recent work develops a particularly significant respect in which this is true (Krieger and Fiske 2006) .
Krieger and Fiske observe that under existing law an employer may defend against a claim of employment discrimination by establishing that when it made the challenged employment decision it was acting under an "honest belief" that the employee had a particular problem or flaw; the law is inattentive to the possibility that the perception of the problem or flaw may itself be the product of racial or other group-based bias. Thus, for instance, if an employer establishes in court that it terminated an employee for (what the employer perceived was) poor performance, the employer automatically prevails even though, as Krieger and Fiske describe, there is a real chance that the employer's perception was influenced by implicit bias (pp. 1036-38) . In one striking study they describe, subjects needed to rank the importance of education and relevant job experience for choosing a high-level construction manager. In the study, when the male candidate had more education and less relevant job experience, subjects reported that they viewed education as more important than job experience, and most selected the male candidate. But when the male candidate had more job experience, subjects ranked job experience as more important, and again most selected the male candidate. The subjects'
"honest belief" appeared to be that they were choosing based on either education or job experience, and indeed when subjects were required to rank the criteria before knowing how the male and female candidates fared, the gender bias largely disappeared. But in the real world, in which traits are known as information is being processed, Krieger and Fiske suggest that an "honest belief" may often bear a heavy racial or other imprint. Note that this argument is most applicable to cases of subjective "honest" reasons; objective reasons -for instance, the employee's attendance record -would be at least somewhat easier to pinpoint as biased if, indeed, they were.
As Krieger and Fiske note, the scope of the argument about the "honest belief" rule is substantial because in a world in which antidiscrimination ideals hold strong sway, "people whose preferences are implicitly shaped by group membership spontaneously search for independent decision criteria consistent with their preference, and use those criteria to justify their choices to themselves and others" (p. 1037). Ironically, the very strength of the norms against discrimination in today's society encourages decision makers to think in ways that do not appear to them to be biased -even when they are. Thus, Krieger and Fiske have identified a significant shortcoming of existing antidiscrimination law in addressing the problem of implicitly biased behavior.
Departures from Expected Utility Theory and Employment Mandates
As noted above, a second type of boundedly rational behavior involves departures from expected utility theory. Section 4.2.1 describes this category, while section 4.2.2 discusses how departures from expected utility theory help to predict the effects of a range of employment mandates, from health insurance mandates to family and medical leave mandates.
Departures from Expected Utility Theory
While expected utility theory is a foundational aspect of traditional economics, empirical departures from the precepts of this theory are common. A prominent example is the "endowment effect," according to which individuals' behavior is influenced by their starting points. In the well-known mugs experiments (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1990) , for instance, randomly selected individuals who received a mug attached selling prices for the mug that were far higher than the buying prices chosen by randomly selected individuals who did not receive a mug. Evidently, being "endowed" with a mug greatly affects attitudes toward the mug, as individuals attach value not just to the end states (having versus not having a mug) but also to the transitions (receiving versus giving up a mug) (Kahneman 2000) .
The mugs experiments were important in part for ruling out a host of potential alternative explanations for the observed endowment effect. In addition to allocating mugs, the experimenters in the mugs study allocated tokens with preassigned cash values (the amounts for which subjects could redeem the tokens at the end of the study). Trading in tokens followed precisely the predictions of traditional economic theory; exactly half of the tokens changed hands, as theory would predict in light of the random assignment of tokens, and thus neither transaction costs nor other general trading barriers could explain the behavior observed in the case of the mugs.
The endowment effect has many important implications for legal design generally, as discussed in Jolls (2007a) . The next subsection overviews a key set of implications in the specific domain of employment law.
The Endowment Effect and Employment Mandates
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A frequent claim in law and economics analysis of employment law is that the imposition of mandatory employment terms will tend to reduce employment levels by operating as a tax on their transaction (for example, Posner 1998). On this view, because the parties did not bargain for the term in question when left to their own devices, the cost of the term must exceed its benefit (for otherwise they would have agreed to it on their own). Thus, for example, if a particular employment benefit is worth $100 per year to employees and costs the employer only $90 to provide, a mandate should not be necessary; but if we do not observe the parties agreeing to the benefit on their own, then the cost must exceed $100. Imposing a mandatory term in these circumstances will operate as a tax on the parties, causing the wage to fall by somewhere between the benefit and the cost of the term, and causing the employment level to fall (Summers 1989 ).
The endowment effect calls this account into question. As described above, the endowment effect implies that people are often less willing to sell entitlements that are given to them than to buy entitlements that they do not already possess; if given a mug, they will not sell it for $X, but if not given a mug, they will not buy one for that price. Thus, the fact that employees choose not to purchase a particular workplace benefit if they are not granted an entitlement to it does not imply that they would want to sell the entitlement (if they could) once it has been granted. The corollary of this observation is that imposing a mandatory term may have different effects than the standard analysis predicts (Craswell 1991) . In supply-and-demand terms, imagine a labor supply curve prior to the imposition of the mandate, reflecting willingness to work at different wage levels given provision of the benefit; the consequence of the endowment effect may be that this curve is shifted to the right once the mandate is imposed, and this move may more than compensate for the backward shift in the employer's labor demand curve as a result of the mandate. If this occurs, then the wages of the affected worker will fall by as much as or more than the cost of the benefit.
Empirical evidence provides support for the endowment effect analysis of employment mandates. The seminal study in this area is Gruber (1994). Gruber's study examines the effects of imposing mandatory coverage of childbirth expenses in employer-provided insurance policies.
Imposition of the mandatory health-insurance term -which represented a substantial departure from the usual contractual arrangements prior to the mandate -caused the wages of affected workers (most prominently, married women of childbearing age) to fall by at least the cost of the mandated coverage according to most of the author's estimates. The study also found that the hours of employment of these workers were either unchanged or slightly higher with the mandate and that their probability of being employed was either unchanged or slightly lower. In sum, "[t]he findings consistently suggest shifting of the costs of the mandates on the order of 100 percent, with little effect on net labor input" (Gruber 1994, p. 623) .
These findings are difficult to reconcile with the Posnerian account, which predicts a fall in wages less than the cost of the benefit. (If the wage were going to adjust by the full cost of the benefit, then some substantial fraction of employers should have offered the benefit even prior to the mandate.) Of course, if the Posnerian account is modified to incorporate a conventional market failure such as adverse selection, then Gruber's findings may be explained without reference to the endowment effect, as Gruber notes.
Several caveats to the endowment effect analysis bear emphasis. First, while the endowment effect is consistent with complete or more than complete adjustment of the wage, it is also possible to have less than complete adjustment of the wage in the presence of the endowment effect. Perhaps workers are not any more willing to supply labor in exchange for a given wage plus the benefit in question once they have an entitlement to the benefit; it may be just that they would be even less willing to supply labor in the absence of the benefit.
The second qualification is that the endowment effect may not operate in contexts in which the beneficiaries of a mandatory term must give up a preexisting level of income, since they may be highly averse to such a loss (for example, Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . This qualification is potentially important, as employees may face a financial loss relative to some preexisting expectation when a new benefit is mandated.
The final qualification is that the analysis offered here is purely positive, concerned with the effects of imposing a mandatory employment term. The endowment effect does not necessarily imply that, from a normative perspective, such terms are desirable; they may be efficient, in the sense that they would not be undone (if they could be) once imposed, but the situation without such terms is also efficient, for the same reasons given by the Posnerian account, and there is no obvious means by which the two situations can be compared.
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Conclusion
A wide range of employment law rules -from wage payment law to pension regulation to minimum wages to prohibitions on employment discrimination to mandated health insurance and workplace leave -are illuminated by consideration of bounded will power, bounded selfinterest, and bounded rationality. The effects of employment law turn in significant part on how employees and employers act in response to this law, and thus it is not at all surprising that behavioral economics can help both to understand and in some cases to improve employment law.
